<\/p>\n
by Henry Hansmann\u00a0and Steen Thomsen, November 2018.<\/p>\n
Hansmann Thomsen – Foundation Governance – 2018 Nov<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n by Steen Thomsen, November 2018.<\/p>\n Foundation Ownership and Firm performance<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n by Steen Thomsen, August 2018.<\/p>\n Foundation Ownership at IKEA<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n by Steen Thomsen, Thomas Poulsen, Christa B\u00f8rsting & Johan Kuhn. June 2018.<\/p>\n Correction added to the ‘Acknowledgements’ section of the paper planned to be published online and in the first issue of CGIR in 2019: Funding from the The Research Project on Industrial Foundations\u00a0www.tifp.dk<\/a>\u00a0is gratefully acknowledged.<\/em><\/p>\n Industrial foundations as long-term owners<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n by Christa B\u00f8rsting and Steen Thomsen. 11th August 2017.<\/p>\n Foundation Ownership, Reputation and labour<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n by Christa B\u00f8rsting, Johan Kuhn, Thomas Poulsen and Steen Thomsen, August 11th 2017.<\/p>\n Industrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Steen Thomsen, May 4, 2016<\/p>\n Novo Nordisk 09<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Johan Kuhn, 2015<\/p>\n FoundationsAggregates2<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 8.\u00a0October 2015<\/p>\n Foundation Ownership at Kavli12<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Steen Thomsen og Johan Kuhn, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 19. juni 2015<\/p>\n Performance Drivers in Foundation-Owned Firms II<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Steen Thomsen, Thomas Poulsen og Johan Kuhn Foundation ownership and Externalities<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Susanne N\u00f8rgaard, CBS\/PwC, Revision & Regnskabsv\u00e6sen nr. 4, April 2015<\/p>\n Skat ved overdragelse af virksomhed til en fond<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Jonan K\u00fchn, Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. 2 December 2014<\/p>\n The Demagraphy of Danish Foundation-Owned Companies<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Steen Thomsen og Signe Marie Degn, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS.<\/p>\n 2 December 2014<\/p>\n The Charters og Industrial Foundations<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Steen Thomsen,\u00a0Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. 16 April 2015<\/p>\n Foundation Ownership at Ramboll<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Edited by Williamson, J., Driver, C., and Kenway, P. (Eds) (2014) TUC, London July<\/p>\n Danish Industrial Foundations’ in Beyond Shareholder Value: The Reasons and Choices for Corporate Governance Reform<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af professor Ph. D. student\u00a0Christa B\u00f8rsting, Research fellow, Post Doc.\u00a0Johan K\u00fchn,\u00a0Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og\u00a0\u00a0Professor Steen Thomsen,\u00a0Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. Capital Structure in Industrial Foundations and their Firms<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Et baggrundspaper til The Research Project on Industrial Foundations<\/em> Erhvervsdrivende fonde og almennyttige foranstaltninger – et historisk perspektiv<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af professor Steen Thomsen, Department of International Economics and Management Copenhagen Business School The Nordic countries have attracted considerable attention in recent years as a benchmark for good governance. However, while the political governance characteristics of the Nordic model \u2013 particularly the welfare state – are well understood, its corporate governance characteristics remain elusive to the international audience. This paper therefore reviews the Nordic corporate governance model with special emphasis on a unique ownership structure, industrial foundations (foundations that own business companies). Rather than a meticulous description of details it emphasizes the Nordic model as a mode of capitalism which other countries may learn from.<\/p>\n Industrial Foundations and the Nordic Model III<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af professor S\u00f8ren Bo Nielsen, CBS. Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper attempts to place industrial foundations (IFs in the following; similar to trusts) in the\u00a0tax system. An industrial foundation is a private foundation that holds a voting majority in a joint stock\u00a0corporation. These IFs are probably more prevalent in Denmark than in any other country, and the paper\u00a0starts by reviewing some stylized facts and figures for IFs in Denmark. Thereafter, it recalls basic desires as to the structure and logic in the tax system and demonstrates how they lead to a system akin to the \u2018dual income tax\u2019 system which has inspired tax reforms in the Nordic countries and elsewhere. This system implies clear consequences for the taxation of different types of income, labor income and capital income. However, as the outline of the system is based on the premise that \u201cpeople pay taxes\u201d, industrial foundations, having no personal owners, do not immediately fit in. So what to do? The paper explores the implications of treating IFs as high\u2010income earners (wealthy individuals) and draws the conclusion that in the current system, IFs are very leniently taxed relative to that benchmark. Lenient tax treatment relative to the norm is regularly interpreted as tax expenditures; the usual recommendation for such indirect subsidies is to render them direct by transferring them from the revenue to the expenditure side of the budget.<\/p>\n Industrial foundations in the tax system<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Ph. D. student\u00a0Christa B\u00f8rsting, Research fellow, Post Doc.\u00a0Johan K\u00fchn,\u00a0Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og\u00a0\u00a0Professor Steen Thomsen,\u00a0Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n We study turnover among executives and directors in companies owned by Danish industrial foundations, which are held to be long term owners. Executives are members of the management board (direktionen), whereas directors a members of the supervisiory board (bestyrelsen). As expected, we find that both director and executive turnover is lower in foundation-owned companies. Foundation-owned companies are more likely to replace directors, but not executives, when performance is bad (negative profits). Thus, we find some evidence of long-termism in foundation-owned companies.<\/p>\n The Governance of Industrial Foundations – Executive and Director Turnover<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Ph. D. student\u00a0Christa B\u00f8rsting, Research fellow, Post Doc.\u00a0Johan K\u00fchn,\u00a0Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og\u00a0\u00a0Professor Steen Thomsen,\u00a0Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n We study the relative performance of Danish foundation-owned companies 2000-2012. We find that foundation-owned companies have lower sales growth and accounting returns than other companies, but higher factor productivity and similar rates of productivity growth. Size effects appear to be important in that large foundation-owned firms overperform, while small foundation-owned firms underperform. However, foundation-owned companies also have lower risk (volatility of earnings), and we find no differences in risk-adjusted accounting returns.<\/p>\n The Performance of Danish Foundation-Owned Companies<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Ph. D. student\u00a0Christa B\u00f8rsting, Research fellow, Post Doc.\u00a0Johan K\u00fchn,\u00a0Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og\u00a0\u00a0Professor Steen Thomsen,\u00a0Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n We study Danish industrial foundations as long-term owners of business companies. We document that foundation ownership is more stable compared to other ownership structure. Moreover foundation-owned companies are more conservatively financed, and they have higher survival rates.<\/p>\n Longtermism02 II<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Statsautoriseret revisor Susanne N\u00f8rgaard, PwC og CBS, Revision og Regnskabsv\u00e6sen, nr. 4, 2014, side 56 ff.<\/p>\n Skattebetaling i de erhvervsdrivende fonde<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Peter Loft, tidl. departementchef, adj. professor v. CBS, \u00a0Revision & Regnskabsv\u00e6sen nr. 12 \u00b7 2013<\/p>\n Baggrunden for fondsbeskatningen\u00a0<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Statsautoriseret revisor Susanne N\u00f8rgaard, PwC og CBS, Revision og Regnskabsv\u00e6sen Online, RR.2013.08.0048<\/p>\n Skattereglerne for erhvervsdrivende fonde<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af professor S\u00f8ren Bo Nielsen, CBS, 17. april, 2013, Seminar om Skat og Erhvervsfonde<\/p>\n Erhvervsdrivende fonde i skattesystemet<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af Statsautoriseret revisor Susanne N\u00f8rgaard, PwC og CBS, 17. april, 2013, Seminar om Skat og Erhvervsfonde<\/p>\n Fondsbeskatning: Hvordan er reglerne i dag? <\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af professor Steen Thomsen, February 19, 2013, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Industrial Foundations (foundations that own business companies) are found around the world e.g in Northern Europe, Germany, the US and India, but nowhere do they appear to be as economically important as in Denmark. In this paper we review their share of the Danish economy. We find that foundation-owned companies account for 5-10% of the Danish economy depending on measurement. However, they constitute the bulk of Danish stock market capitalization and R&D expenditure, and they also contribute disproportionally to international business activity. Finally the industrial foundations make charitable donations of approximately 0.5% of Danish GDP, primarily to research.<\/p>\n Industrial Foundations in the Danish economy<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Af professor Steen Thomsen, August 8, 2012, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Industrial Foundations are foundations which own business companies. They are quite common in Northern Europe, but also occasionally found in other parts of the world. Several well-known companies like the Tata Group, Robert Bosch, Hershey, the Guardian, Aldi or Maersk are owned in this way. Because of their combination of non- profit and for-profit characteristics foundation-owned companies pose interesting questions to current theories of the firm. Can non-profit ownership be economically efficient? Can they derive competitive advantages from their ownership structure? How are foundation-owned companies governed? Such questions are interesting given the economic importance in Northern Europe, but they may also carry more general lessons for corporate governance. This paper surveys the sparse literature and poses questions for future research.<\/p>\n Artikel:\u00a0What Do We Know about Industrial Foundations?<\/a><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Erhvervsjuridisk tiddsskrift 2012.221, Af professor dr. jur. Erik Werlauff, Aalborg Universitet<\/p>\n Artiklen analyserer nogle centrale fondsretlige problemstillinger under inddragelse af nu n\u00e6sten 30 \u00e5rs erfaringer med fondslovene. Artiklen er i s\u00e6rlig grad koncentreret om de erhversdrivende fonde, men ogs\u00e5 med en del bem\u00e6rkninger om de ikke-erhvervsdrivende. Artiklen rummer en r\u00e6kke betragtninger de lege ferenda.<\/p>\n Artikel: Centrale fondsretlige proble<\/a>mstillinger<\/a><\/span><\/em><\/p>\n Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 14. marts 2012.<\/p>\n Clara Rao & Steen Thomsen:\u00a0<\/strong>Vi redeg\u00f8r for en unders\u00f8gelse af uddelinger og omkostninger i danske fonde fra 2006-2010 og en sp\u00f8rgeskemavurdering af uddelingerne frem til 2012. Der er sket en markant for\u00f8gelse af fondenes uddelinger siden 2009, og de erhvervsdrivende fonde deler nu omkring 6 mia. kr. ud \u00e5rligt. Halvdelen af donationerne g\u00e5r til forskning og tegner sig for 5% af den samlede danske forskningsindsats. Omkostningerne er ogs\u00e5 steget, men omkostningerne per uddelt krone er faldet. S\u00e6rligt filantropiske fonde4 har nogle udfordringer med hensyn til \u00e5benhed.<\/p>\nArtikel: Uddelinger og omkostninger i danske fonde<\/a><\/span><\/address>\n Professor Hansmann and Professor\u00a0Thomsen presented a paper on foundation governance at the conference\u00a0on corporate governance after the financial crisis at the University of Oxford\u00a0(co-arranged with the University of Columbia), January 13-14, 2012. (Revised November 2018)<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n Industrial foundations are nonprofit foundations that own business companies. These entities are not uncommon in Northern Europe and many successful international companies are owned in thus way. Because of their good performance and unusual combination of nonprofit and for-profit entities, they present interesting challenges to theories of the firm. In this paper, we present the first study of the manner in which the foundations govern the companies that they own. We work with a rich data set comprising 121 foundation-owned Danish companies over the period 2003-2008,<\/p>\n We focus in particular on a composite structural factor that we term “managerial distance.” We interpret this as a measure of the clarity and objectivity with which a foundation-owned company\u2019s top managers are induced to focus on the company\u2019s profitability. More particularly, managerial distance seems best interpreted as a factor, or aggregate of component factors, that put the foundation board in the position of “virtual owners,” in the sense that the information and decisions facing the managers are framed for them in roughly the way they would be framed for profit-seeking outside owners of the company. Our empirical analysis shows a positive, significant, and robust association between managerial distance and company economic performance. The findings appear to illuminate not just foundation governance, but corporate governance more generally.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Paper:\u00a0Hansmann Thomsen – Foundation Governance – 2018 Nov<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n Copenhagen Business School, 22 December, 2011.<\/p>\n Abstract<\/strong><\/p>\n The Indian Tata Group is one of the largest and most admired business groups in the world. It has 28 listed subsidiaries and more than 80 operating businesses. It has shown strong financial performance and social responsibility for decades. Interestingly, it has a unique ownership structure: the main holding company Tata Sons Limited is majority-owned by charitable trusts. We examine the governance of this remarkable entity. The Trusts own 66% of Tata Sons, the main holding company of the Group, while members of the founding Tata family are very small minority shareholders. The governance structure is characterized by managerial distance between trusts and Group companies. The Trusts are almost exclusively concerned with philanthropy, and according to the Articles of Association of Tata Sons Limited, their governance role is limited to nominating two members to the Selection Committee which recommends the Chairman of the company\u2019s Board of Directors. Group companies are independently managed, but there are significant cross shareholdings and a member of the founding family, Mr Ratan Tata, chairs the Trusts, holding companies and major subsidiaries. Mr. Cyrus P Mistry, Managing Director of the Shapoorji Pallonji Group, a minority shareholder in Tata Sons, is to succeed Mr. Ratan Tata as chairman of Tata Sons in 2012. Trustees in the major Trusts are paid nominal fees of as little as $10 and $20 a year.<\/p>\n Financial Times, 5 December, 2011\u00a010:56 pm<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Der fokuseres p\u00e5 de st\u00f8rre fonde med betydelig erhvervsaktivitet med udgangspunkt i et eksisterende datas\u00e6t af 121 fondsejede virksomheder med mere end 50 ansatte over perioden 2003-2008. Dette datas\u00e6t vil blive udbygget over tid og med kontrol for overlevelsesbias samt til at d\u00e6kke erhvervsdrivende fonde, der ikke har v\u00e6ret omfattet af tidligere unders\u00f8gelser. Det samme datas\u00e6t vil muligg\u00f8re dannelse af s\u00e5 sammenlignelige kontrolgrupper som muligt af ikke-fondsejede selskaber.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Projektet vil herudover benytte sig af sp\u00f8rgeskemaer for at tilvejebringe information, der ikke normalt er offentlig tilg\u00e6ngelig. Det g\u00e6lder eksempelvis ledelsesforhold, uddelinger m.v. I mange tilf\u00e6lde vil det v\u00e6re hensigtsm\u00e6ssigt at bruge case studier af enkelte fonde eller fondsejede virksomheder. P\u00e5 s\u00e6rlige omr\u00e5der (eks. vedt\u00e6gts\u00e6ndringer) vil projektet unders\u00f8ge mulighederne for aktindsigt.\u00a0Endvidere vil projektet s\u00f8ge at skabe kontakt til internationale datakilder samt at opbygge et bibliotek af litteraturreferencer, arbejdspapirer og rapporter.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Projektet vil resultere i 10 delrapporter og 4 oversigtsrapporter, der diskuteres med danske og internationale sagkyndige og herefter formidles til alle interesserede p\u00e5 projektets hjemmeside og offentligt tilg\u00e6ngelige seminarer p\u00e5 CBS.\u00a0En r\u00e6kke workshops og seminarer med deltagelse af internationale forskere vil bidrage b\u00e5de til forskning og formidling. Sproget vil som hovedregel v\u00e6re engelsk af hensyn til den internationale formidling, bl.a. til EU.\u00a0Rapporterne vil efter videre bearbejdning danne baggrund for videnskabelige artikler i internationale tidsskrifter.\u00a0Som slutdokument vil projektet udm\u00f8nte sig i en engelsksproget publikation, som p\u00e5 en overskuelig, men veldokumenteret m\u00e5de forklarer udl\u00e6ndinge om de danske erhvervsdrivende fonde.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Der er en juridisk litteratur om erhvervsdrivende fonde, der naturligt nok overvejende behandler fondsret\u00a0 (Kronke 1988, Mikkelsen & Werlauff 2008), og der findes et enkelt historisk studie (Johansen og\u00a0 M\u00f8ller, 2004). Den samfundsvidenskabelige litteratur om erhvervsdrivende fonde er dog yderst begr\u00e6nset. Derimod er der en betydelig international litteratur om non-profits (Hansmann 1980, 1996,\u00a0 Fama and Jensen 1983, 1985,\u00a0 Glaeser and Schleifer (2001) Glaeser (2003)) samt en meget omfattende litteratur om velg\u00f8rende fonde og filantropi.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n En kort opsummering af den eksisterende litteratur om erhvervsdrivende fondsejerskab er som f\u00f8lger. Thomsen (1996, 1999), Thomsen og Rose (2004) i Danmark, Herman og Franke (2003) i Tyskland og Dzanzig (2011) i Sverige unders\u00f8ger, hvordan fondsejede virksomheder klarer sig sammenlignet med andre ejerformer. De finder alle en relativt god performance, som ligger lidt over eller p\u00e5 linje med andre virksomheders. \u00a0Thomsen (2005, upubliceret) finder, at fondsejede virksomheder har et bedre omd\u00f8mme. Hansmann og Thomsen (2010, upubliceret) unders\u00f8ger selskabsledelse i fondsejede virksomheder og finder en positiv affekt af ledelsesm\u00e6ssig adskillelse mellem fond og virksomhed p\u00e5 virksomhedernes performance.\u00a0Fleischmann (2001) og Thomsen (2006) unders\u00f8ger europ\u00e6isk og amerikansk lovgivning som \u00e5rsag til en forskellig udbredelse af erhvervsdrivende fonde. De finder, at det begr\u00e6nsede amerikanske fondsejerskab kan henf\u00f8res til en stramning af lovgivningen i 1969.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Denne korte opsummering g\u00f8r det klart, at der er mange v\u00e6sentlige sp\u00f8rgsm\u00e5l, som ikke er behandlet, ligesom den sparsomme eksisterende litteratur p\u00e5 flere omr\u00e5der fortjener uddybning.\u00a0 Den manglende viden giver anledning til mange misforst\u00e5elser, som man kan se af dagspressen. Et vigtigt form\u00e5l med projektet er s\u00e5ledes at skabe et tilfredsstillende faktuelt grundlag for den videre diskussion.<\/p>\nFoundation Ownership and Firm Performance – a Review of the International Evidence<\/h3>\n
Foundation Ownership at IKEA<\/h3>\n
Industrial foundations as long-term owners<\/h3>\n
Foundation Ownership, Reputation, and Labour<\/h3>\n
Industrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners<\/h3>\n
Foundation Ownership at Novo Nordisk<\/h3>\n
Research Note: Industrial Foundations in the Danish Register Databases<\/h3>\n
Foundation Ownership at Kavli<\/h3>\n
Performance Drivers in Foundation-owned Firms<\/h3>\n
Foundation Ownership and Externalities: The Economic Impact of Industrial Foundations123<\/h3>\n
\nPapiret blev pr\u00e6senteret til et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 5. juni 2013<\/p>\nSkat ved overdragelse af virksomhed til en fond<\/h3>\n
The Demography of Danish Foundation- Owned Companies<\/h3>\n
The Charters of Industrial Foundations<\/h3>\n
Foundation Ownership at Ramboll<\/h3>\n
‘Danish Industrial Foundations’ in Beyond Shareholder Value: The Reasons and Choices for Corporate Governance Reform<\/h3>\n
Capital Structure in Industrial Foundations and their Firms<\/h3>\n
\n4. december 2013<\/p>\nErhvervsdrivende fonde og almennyttige foranstaltninger – et historisk perspektiv<\/h3>\n
\nAf professor emeritus, dr. oecon, Hans Christiansen Johan<\/p>\nNordic Corporate Governance and Industrial Foundations<\/h3>\n
\n4. november 2014<\/p>\nAbstract<\/strong><\/h3>\n
Industrial foundations in the tax system<\/h3>\n
\nPapiret blev pr\u00e6senteret i slutningen af august p\u00e5 International Institute of Public Finance\u2019s 70th Annual Congress i Lugano.<\/p>\nThe Governance of Industrial Foundations: Executive and Director Turnover<\/h3>\n
\nTidligere versioner af papiret blev pr\u00e6senteret p\u00e5 et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 1. December 2013.<\/p>\nThe Performance of Danish Foundation-Owned Companies<\/h3>\n
\nPapiret blev pr\u00e6senteret p\u00e5 et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, maj 2013.<\/p>\nIndustrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners<\/h3>\n
\n8. oktober 2014<\/p>\nSkattebetaling i de erhvervsdrivende fonde<\/h3>\n
Baggrunden for fondsbeskatningen<\/h3>\n
Skattereglerne for erhvervsdrivende fonde<\/h3>\n
Erhvervsdrivende fonde i skattesystemet<\/h3>\n
Fondsbeskatning: Hvordan er reglerne i dag?<\/h3>\n
Industrial Foundations in the Danish Economy<\/h3>\n
What Do We Know (and Not Know) about Industrial Foundations?<\/h3>\n
Centrale fondsretlige problemstillinger<\/h3>\n
Uddelinger og omkostninger i danske fonde<\/h3>\n
Governance of Industrial Foundations<\/h3>\n
Trust Ownership of the Tata Group<\/h3>\n
A model for healthier profits<\/h3>\n
Datagrundlag og formidling<\/h3>\n
Data<\/h5>\n
Formidling<\/h5>\n
Litteratur<\/h3>\n