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Center for Corporate Governance

Phone: +45 3815 2515

Mail: ccg@cbs.dk

Artikler og papirer

Foundation Ownership, Reputation, and Labour

by Christa Børsting and Steen Thomsen. 11th August 2017.

Foundation Ownership, Reputation and labour

Industrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners

by Christa Børsting, Johan Kuhn, Thomas Poulsen and Steen Thomsen, August 11th 2017.

Industrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners

Foundation Ownership at Novo Nordisk

Af Steen Thomsen, May 4, 2016

Novo Nordisk 09

Research Note: Industrial Foundations in the Danish Register Databases

Af Johan Kuhn, 2015

Foundations Aggregates

Foundation Ownership at Kavli

Af Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 8. October 2015

Foundation Ownership at Kavli12

Performance Drivers in Foundation-owned Firms

Af Steen Thomsen og Johan Kuhn, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 19. juni 2015

Performance Drivers in Foundation-Owned Firms

Foundation Ownership and Externalities: The Economic Impact of Industrial Foundations123

Af Steen Thomsen, Thomas Poulsen og Johan Kuhn
Papiret blev præsenteret til et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 5. juni 2013

Foundation ownership and Externalities

Skat ved overdragelse af virksomhed til en fond

Af Susanne Nørgaard, CBS/PwC, Revision & Regnskabsvæsen nr. 4, April 2015

Skat ved overdragelse af virksomhed til en fond

The Demography of Danish Foundation- Owned Companies

Af Jonan Kühn, Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. 2 December 2014

The Demagraphy of Danish Foundation-Owned Companies

The Charters of Industrial Foundations

Af Steen Thomsen og Signe Marie Degn, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS.

2 December 2014

The Charters og Industrial Foundations

Foundation Ownership at Ramboll

Af Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS. 16 April 2015

Foundation Ownership at Ramboll

‘Danish Industrial Foundations’ in Beyond Shareholder Value: The Reasons and Choices for Corporate Governance Reform

Edited by Williamson, J., Driver, C., and Kenway, P. (Eds) (2014) TUC, London July

Danish Industrial Foundations’ in Beyond Shareholder Value: The Reasons and Choices for Corporate Governance Reform

Capital Structure in Industrial Foundations and their Firms

Af professor Ph. D. student Christa Børsting, Research fellow, Post Doc. Johan Kühn, Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og  Professor Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS.
4. december 2013

Capital Structure in Industrial Foundations and their Firms

Erhvervsdrivende fonde og almennyttige foranstaltninger – et historisk perspektiv

Et baggrundspaper til The Research Project on Industrial Foundations
Af professor emeritus, dr. oecon, Hans Christiansen Johan

Erhvervsdrivende fonde og almennyttige foranstaltninger – et historisk perspektiv

Nordic Corporate Governance and Industrial Foundations

Af professor Steen Thomsen, Department of International Economics and Management Copenhagen Business School
4. november 2014

Abstract

The Nordic countries have attracted considerable attention in recent years as a benchmark for good governance. However, while the political governance characteristics of the Nordic model – particularly the welfare state – are well understood, its corporate governance characteristics remain elusive to the international audience. This paper therefore reviews the Nordic corporate governance model with special emphasis on a unique ownership structure, industrial foundations (foundations that own business companies). Rather than a meticulous description of details it emphasizes the Nordic model as a mode of capitalism which other countries may learn from.

Industrial Foundations and the Nordic Model III

Industrial foundations in the tax system

Af professor Søren Bo Nielsen, CBS.
Papiret blev præsenteret i slutningen af august på International Institute of Public Finance’s 70th Annual Congress i Lugano.

Abstract

This paper attempts to place industrial foundations (IFs in the following; similar to trusts) in the tax system. An industrial foundation is a private foundation that holds a voting majority in a joint stock corporation. These IFs are probably more prevalent in Denmark than in any other country, and the paper starts by reviewing some stylized facts and figures for IFs in Denmark. Thereafter, it recalls basic desires as to the structure and logic in the tax system and demonstrates how they lead to a system akin to the ‘dual income tax’ system which has inspired tax reforms in the Nordic countries and elsewhere. This system implies clear consequences for the taxation of different types of income, labor income and capital income. However, as the outline of the system is based on the premise that “people pay taxes”, industrial foundations, having no personal owners, do not immediately fit in. So what to do? The paper explores the implications of treating IFs as high‐income earners (wealthy individuals) and draws the conclusion that in the current system, IFs are very leniently taxed relative to that benchmark. Lenient tax treatment relative to the norm is regularly interpreted as tax expenditures; the usual recommendation for such indirect subsidies is to render them direct by transferring them from the revenue to the expenditure side of the budget.

Industrial foundations in the tax system

The Governance of Industrial Foundations: Executive and Director Turnover

Af Ph. D. student Christa Børsting, Research fellow, Post Doc. Johan Kühn, Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og  Professor Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS.
Tidligere versioner af papiret blev præsenteret på et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 1. December 2013.

Abstract

We study turnover among executives and directors in companies owned by Danish industrial foundations, which are held to be long term owners. Executives are members of the management board (direktionen), whereas directors a members of the supervisiory board (bestyrelsen). As expected, we find that both director and executive turnover is lower in foundation-owned companies. Foundation-owned companies are more likely to replace directors, but not executives, when performance is bad (negative profits). Thus, we find some evidence of long-termism in foundation-owned companies.

The Governance of Industrial Foundations – Executive and Director Turnover

The Performance of Danish Foundation-Owned Companies

Af Ph. D. student Christa Børsting, Research fellow, Post Doc. Johan Kühn, Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og  Professor Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS.
Papiret blev præsenteret på et seminar ved Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, maj 2013.

Abstract

We study the relative performance of Danish foundation-owned companies 2000-2012. We find that foundation-owned companies have lower sales growth and accounting returns than other companies, but higher factor productivity and similar rates of productivity growth. Size effects appear to be important in that large foundation-owned firms overperform, while small foundation-owned firms underperform. However, foundation-owned companies also have lower risk (volatility of earnings), and we find no differences in risk-adjusted accounting returns.

The Performance of Danish Foundation-Owned Companies

Industrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners

Af Ph. D. student Christa Børsting, Research fellow, Post Doc. Johan Kühn, Associate Professor, Ph.D. Thomas Poulsen og  Professor Steen Thomsen, Center for Corporate Governance, CBS.
8. oktober 2014

Abstract

We study Danish industrial foundations as long-term owners of business companies. We document that foundation ownership is more stable compared to other ownership structure. Moreover foundation-owned companies are more conservatively financed, and they have higher survival rates.

Industrial Foundations as Long-Term Owners

Skattebetaling i de erhvervsdrivende fonde

Af Statsautoriseret revisor Susanne Nørgaard, PwC og CBS, Revision og Regnskabsvæsen, nr. 4, 2014, side 56 ff.

Skattebetaling i de erhvervsdrivende fonde

Baggrunden for fondsbeskatningen

Af Peter Loft, tidl. departementchef, adj. professor v. CBS,  Revision & Regnskabsvæsen nr. 12 · 2013

Baggrunden for fondsbeskatningen 

Skattereglerne for erhvervsdrivende fonde

Af Statsautoriseret revisor Susanne Nørgaard, PwC og CBS, Revision og Regnskabsvæsen Online, RR.2013.08.0048

Skattereglerne for erhvervsdrivende fonde

Erhvervsdrivende fonde i skattesystemet

Af professor Søren Bo Nielsen, CBS, 17. april, 2013, Seminar om Skat og Erhvervsfonde

Erhvervsdrivende fonde i skattesystemet

Fondsbeskatning: Hvordan er reglerne i dag?

Af Statsautoriseret revisor Susanne Nørgaard, PwC og CBS, 17. april, 2013, Seminar om Skat og Erhvervsfonde

Fondsbeskatning: Hvordan er reglerne i dag?

Industrial Foundations in the Danish Economy

Af professor Steen Thomsen, February 19, 2013, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School.

Abstract

Industrial Foundations (foundations that own business companies) are found around the world e.g in Northern Europe, Germany, the US and India, but nowhere do they appear to be as economically important as in Denmark. In this paper we review their share of the Danish economy. We find that foundation-owned companies account for 5-10% of the Danish economy depending on measurement. However, they constitute the bulk of Danish stock market capitalization and R&D expenditure, and they also contribute disproportionally to international business activity. Finally the industrial foundations make charitable donations of approximately 0.5% of Danish GDP, primarily to research.

Artikel: Industrial Foundations in the Danish Economy

What Do We Know (and Not Know) about Industrial Foundations?

Af professor Steen Thomsen, August 8, 2012, Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School.

Abstract

Industrial Foundations are foundations which own business companies. They are quite common in Northern Europe, but also occasionally found in other parts of the world. Several well-known companies like the Tata Group, Robert Bosch, Hershey, the Guardian, Aldi or Maersk are owned in this way. Because of their combination of non- profit and for-profit characteristics foundation-owned companies pose interesting questions to current theories of the firm. Can non-profit ownership be economically efficient? Can they derive competitive advantages from their ownership structure? How are foundation-owned companies governed? Such questions are interesting given the economic importance in Northern Europe, but they may also carry more general lessons for corporate governance. This paper surveys the sparse literature and poses questions for future research.

Artikel: What Do We Know about Industrial Foundations?

Centrale fondsretlige problemstillinger

Erhvervsjuridisk tiddsskrift 2012.221, Af professor dr. jur. Erik Werlauff, Aalborg Universitet

Artiklen analyserer nogle centrale fondsretlige problemstillinger under inddragelse af nu næsten 30 års erfaringer med fondslovene. Artiklen er i særlig grad koncentreret om de erhversdrivende fonde, men også med en del bemærkninger om de ikke-erhvervsdrivende. Artiklen rummer en række betragtninger de lege ferenda.

Artikel: Centrale fondsretlige problemstillinger

Uddelinger og omkostninger i danske fonde

Center for Corporate Governance, Copenhagen Business School, 14. marts 2012.

Clara Rao & Steen Thomsen: Vi redegør for en undersøgelse af uddelinger og omkostninger i danske fonde fra 2006-2010 og en spørgeskemavurdering af uddelingerne frem til 2012. Der er sket en markant forøgelse af fondenes uddelinger siden 2009, og de erhvervsdrivende fonde deler nu omkring 6 mia. kr. ud årligt. Halvdelen af donationerne går til forskning og tegner sig for 5% af den samlede danske forskningsindsats. Omkostningerne er også steget, men omkostningerne per uddelt krone er faldet. Særligt filantropiske fonde4 har nogle udfordringer med hensyn til åbenhed.

Artikel: Uddelinger og omkostninger i danske fonde

Governance of Industrial Foundations

Professor Hansmann and Professor Thomsen presented a paper on foundation governance at the conference on corporate governance after the financial crisis at the University of Oxford (co-arranged with the University of Columbia), January 13-14, 2012.

Abstract

Industrial foundations are nonprofit foundations that own business companies. These entities are not uncommon in Northern Europe and many successful international companies are owned in thus way. Because of their good performance and unusual combination of nonprofit and for-profit entities, they present interesting challenges to theories of the firm. In this paper, we present the first study of the manner in which the foundations govern the companies that they own. We work with a rich data set comprising 121 foundation-owned Danish companies over the period 2003-2008,

We focus in particular on a composite structural factor that we term “managerial distance.” We interpret this as a measure of the clarity and objectivity with which a foundation-owned company’s top managers are induced to focus on the company’s profitability. More particularly, managerial distance seems best interpreted as a factor, or aggregate of component factors, that put the foundation board in the position of “virtual owners,” in the sense that the information and decisions facing the managers are framed for them in roughly the way they would be framed for profit-seeking outside owners of the company. Our empirical analysis shows a positive, significant, and robust association between managerial distance and company economic performance. The findings appear to illuminate not just foundation governance, but corporate governance more generally.

Paper: Virtual Ownership and Managerial Distance: The Governance of Industrial Foundations 

Trust Ownership of the Tata Group

Copenhagen Business School, 22 December, 2011.

Abstract

The Indian Tata Group is one of the largest and most admired business groups in the world. It has 28 listed subsidiaries and more than 80 operating businesses. It has shown strong financial performance and social responsibility for decades. Interestingly, it has a unique ownership structure: the main holding company Tata Sons Limited is majority-owned by charitable trusts. We examine the governance of this remarkable entity. The Trusts own 66% of Tata Sons, the main holding company of the Group, while members of the founding Tata family are very small minority shareholders. The governance structure is characterized by managerial distance between trusts and Group companies. The Trusts are almost exclusively concerned with philanthropy, and according to the Articles of Association of Tata Sons Limited, their governance role is limited to nominating two members to the Selection Committee which recommends the Chairman of the company’s Board of Directors. Group companies are independently managed, but there are significant cross shareholdings and a member of the founding family, Mr Ratan Tata, chairs the Trusts, holding companies and major subsidiaries. Mr. Cyrus P Mistry, Managing Director of the Shapoorji Pallonji Group, a minority shareholder in Tata Sons, is to succeed Mr. Ratan Tata as chairman of Tata Sons in 2012. Trustees in the major Trusts are paid nominal fees of as little as $10 and $20 a year.

Paper: Trust Ownership of the Tata Group

A model for healthier profits

Financial Times, 5 December, 2011 10:56 pm

Artikel: A model for healthier profits
Datagrundlag og formidling

Data

Der fokuseres på de større fonde med betydelig erhvervsaktivitet med udgangspunkt i et eksisterende datasæt af 121 fondsejede virksomheder med mere end 50 ansatte over perioden 2003-2008. Dette datasæt vil blive udbygget over tid og med kontrol for overlevelsesbias samt til at dække erhvervsdrivende fonde, der ikke har været omfattet af tidligere undersøgelser. Det samme datasæt vil muliggøre dannelse af så sammenlignelige kontrolgrupper som muligt af ikke-fondsejede selskaber.

Projektet vil herudover benytte sig af spørgeskemaer for at tilvejebringe information, der ikke normalt er offentlig tilgængelig. Det gælder eksempelvis ledelsesforhold, uddelinger m.v. I mange tilfælde vil det være hensigtsmæssigt at bruge case studier af enkelte fonde eller fondsejede virksomheder. På særlige områder (eks. vedtægtsændringer) vil projektet undersøge mulighederne for aktindsigt. Endvidere vil projektet søge at skabe kontakt til internationale datakilder samt at opbygge et bibliotek af litteraturreferencer, arbejdspapirer og rapporter.

Formidling

Projektet vil resultere i 10 delrapporter og 4 oversigtsrapporter, der diskuteres med danske og internationale sagkyndige og herefter formidles til alle interesserede på projektets hjemmeside og offentligt tilgængelige seminarer på CBS. En række workshops og seminarer med deltagelse af internationale forskere vil bidrage både til forskning og formidling. Sproget vil som hovedregel være engelsk af hensyn til den internationale formidling, bl.a. til EU. Rapporterne vil efter videre bearbejdning danne baggrund for videnskabelige artikler i internationale tidsskrifter. Som slutdokument vil projektet udmønte sig i en engelsksproget publikation, som på en overskuelig, men veldokumenteret måde forklarer udlændinge om de danske erhvervsdrivende fonde.

Litteratur

Der er en juridisk litteratur om erhvervsdrivende fonde, der naturligt nok overvejende behandler fondsret  (Kronke 1988, Mikkelsen & Werlauff 2008), og der findes et enkelt historisk studie (Johansen og  Møller, 2004). Den samfundsvidenskabelige litteratur om erhvervsdrivende fonde er dog yderst begrænset. Derimod er der en betydelig international litteratur om non-profits (Hansmann 1980, 1996,  Fama and Jensen 1983, 1985,  Glaeser and Schleifer (2001) Glaeser (2003)) samt en meget omfattende litteratur om velgørende fonde og filantropi.

En kort opsummering af den eksisterende litteratur om erhvervsdrivende fondsejerskab er som følger. Thomsen (1996, 1999), Thomsen og Rose (2004) i Danmark, Herman og Franke (2003) i Tyskland og Dzanzig (2011) i Sverige undersøger, hvordan fondsejede virksomheder klarer sig sammenlignet med andre ejerformer. De finder alle en relativt god performance, som ligger lidt over eller på linje med andre virksomheders.  Thomsen (2005, upubliceret) finder, at fondsejede virksomheder har et bedre omdømme. Hansmann og Thomsen (2010, upubliceret) undersøger selskabsledelse i fondsejede virksomheder og finder en positiv affekt af ledelsesmæssig adskillelse mellem fond og virksomhed på virksomhedernes performance. Fleischmann (2001) og Thomsen (2006) undersøger europæisk og amerikansk lovgivning som årsag til en forskellig udbredelse af erhvervsdrivende fonde. De finder, at det begrænsede amerikanske fondsejerskab kan henføres til en stramning af lovgivningen i 1969.

Denne korte opsummering gør det klart, at der er mange væsentlige spørgsmål, som ikke er behandlet, ligesom den sparsomme eksisterende litteratur på flere områder fortjener uddybning.  Den manglende viden giver anledning til mange misforståelser, som man kan se af dagspressen. Et vigtigt formål med projektet er således at skabe et tilfredsstillende faktuelt grundlag for den videre diskussion.

Link til Litteraturliste (opdateres løbende).